Pieter
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071ed083f7
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feat: Implement per-client SSH key isolation
Resolves #14
Each client now gets a dedicated SSH key pair, ensuring that compromise
of one client server does not grant access to other client servers.
## Changes
### Infrastructure (OpenTofu)
- Replace shared `hcloud_ssh_key.default` with per-client `hcloud_ssh_key.client`
- Each client key read from `keys/ssh/<client_name>.pub`
- Server recreated with new key (dev server only, acceptable downtime)
### Key Management
- Created `keys/ssh/` directory for SSH keys
- Added `.gitignore` to protect private keys from git
- Generated ED25519 key pair for dev client
- Private key gitignored, public key committed
### Scripts
- **`scripts/generate-client-keys.sh`** - Generate SSH key pairs for clients
- Updated `scripts/deploy-client.sh` to check for client SSH key
### Documentation
- **`docs/ssh-key-management.md`** - Complete SSH key management guide
- **`keys/ssh/README.md`** - Quick reference for SSH keys directory
### Configuration
- Removed `ssh_public_key` variable from `variables.tf`
- Updated `terraform.tfvars` to remove shared SSH key reference
- Updated `terraform.tfvars.example` with new key generation instructions
## Security Improvements
✅ Client isolation: Each client has dedicated SSH key
✅ Granular rotation: Rotate keys per-client without affecting others
✅ Defense in depth: Minimize blast radius of key compromise
✅ Proper key storage: Private keys gitignored, backups documented
## Testing
- ✅ Generated new SSH key for dev client
- ✅ Applied OpenTofu changes (server recreated)
- ✅ Tested SSH access: `ssh -i keys/ssh/dev root@78.47.191.38`
- ✅ Verified key isolation: Old shared key removed from Hetzner
## Migration Notes
For existing clients:
1. Generate key: `./scripts/generate-client-keys.sh <client>`
2. Apply OpenTofu: `cd tofu && tofu apply` (will recreate server)
3. Deploy: `./scripts/deploy-client.sh <client>`
For new clients:
1. Generate key first
2. Deploy as normal
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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2026-01-17 19:50:30 +01:00 |
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Pieter
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6bc8e508c6
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Complete SOPS secrets management setup (#5)
Completed Issue #5: SOPS Secrets Management
All objectives met:
- ✅ Age encryption key generated (keys/age-key.txt)
- ✅ SOPS configured with Age backend (.sops.yaml)
- ✅ Secrets directory structure created
- ✅ Example encrypted secrets (shared + test client)
- ✅ Comprehensive documentation for key backup
- ✅ Ready for Ansible integration
Security measures:
- Age private key gitignored (keys/age-key.txt)
- Only encrypted .sops.yaml files committed
- Plaintext secrets explicitly excluded
- Key backup procedures documented
Files added:
- .sops.yaml - SOPS configuration with Age public key
- secrets/shared.sops.yaml - Shared secrets (encrypted)
- secrets/clients/test.sops.yaml - Test client secrets (encrypted)
- secrets/README.md - Complete SOPS usage guide
- keys/README.md - Key backup procedures
- keys/.gitignore - Protects private keys
Updated:
- .gitignore - Allow .sops.yaml, block plaintext
Tested:
- Encryption: ✅ Files encrypted successfully
- Decryption: ✅ Secrets decrypt correctly
- Git safety: ✅ Private key excluded from commits
Next: Ready for Zitadel/Nextcloud deployment with secure credentials
Closes #5
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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2025-12-27 14:23:36 +01:00 |
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